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ABSTRACT
In  a Committee of Wise Men chaired by Alexandre Lamfalussy,
former president of the European Monetary Institute was appointed by the
Economics and Finance Ministers Council to make recommendations on
the regulation of the European securities markets. It proposed a four-level
system to improve the legislative process while ensuring what it called a
democratic and institutional balance. Our paper questions to what extent
the concepts of two basic modes of delegation – agency and trust
relationships – are appropriate tools to interpret the new structure set up by
the Committee. It formulates hypotheses about its policy effectiveness and
the balance of power between Community institutions. Evidence supports
the agency hypothesis: the Lamfalussy process has reduced the average time
taken to negotiate and adopt the first framework directives at level  and it
has facilitated the removal of bottlenecks in the process through parallel
working at levels  and . In this sense, delegation has enhanced policy
effectiveness in the securities sector. But it is much more difficult to assess
the trustee hypothesis: that is, whether the Commission and the Committee
of European Securities Regulators (CESR) in fact act as trustees of the
member states for the benefit of market actors. For the time being, whether
CESR might evolve into a European securities regulator remains an open
question.
Introduction
Financial services, i.e. the banking, insurance and investment services
(securities and investment funds) sectors, formed one of the policy areas
where the single market was still incomplete in  (Young : );
this was especially true in the investment services sector. According
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to Article A of the Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community (EEC) as revised by the Single European Act, the EEC
financial markets were to be integrated by  December . Legislation
had been in force since  (Directive //EEC), but differences in
national regulations, on the one hand, and the sensitivity of these fields
due to their impact on the economy and savings, on the other, curbed its
development.
During the process of the introduction of the euro, financial markets
again came to the forefront (Commission b: ). This led the
European Council of Cardiff to request, on – June , that
the Commission establish a framework for action to improve the
single market in financial services. This framework, adopted by the
Commission on  October , listed several points of action and
proposed the creation of a Financial Services Policy Group (FSPG),
which would ‘ identify and prioritise a set of actions by June  to be
presented to the Council . . . [and] define a number of immediate
priorities to guarantee momentum to the process’ (Commission : ,
points  and ). Based on the recommendations of the FSPG and the
Framework for Action, the Commission then drafted the Financial
Services Action Plan (FSAP) (Commission : –), which contained
forty-three measures to be taken to further the integration of EU financial
markets. Backed by the European Council of Cologne on – June ,
the FSAP had to be implemented by , the deadline set by the
European Council of Lisbon on – March .
With this goal, and taking account of the institutional dispute between
the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament on the
creation of a Committee on Transferable Securities, the Economics and
Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) Council appointed a Committee of Wise
Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets (CWM) on
 July  to assess how best to adapt securities regulation and the
co-operative mechanisms between national regulators to market evolu-
tion (such as alternative trading systems) and to ensure a more effective
transposition and implementation of the regulation. The Committee was
chaired by Alexandre Lamfalussy, former president of the European
Monetary Institute and member of the Segre´ Committee on the
development of a European capital market (Commission : ).
In its initial report, the Committee of Wise Men identified the
functioning of the institutional framework as the main shortcoming of the
Community regulation: it was too slow; the texts adopted were sometimes
ambiguous; transposition deadlines were often not respected; some
sensitive issues were not covered properly (pension funds, international
accounting standards and the European company statute, for instance);
there was no mechanism with which to update the legislation rapidly;
 Christian de Visscher, Olivier Maiscocq and Fre´de´ric Varone
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and the obligations to co-operate were insufficient (CWM : –).
As was mentioned in the final report, ‘ the problem is the system itself’
(Ibid.: ). The Committee therefore proposed a four-level system that
would speed up the legislative process and provide Community institu-
tions with the expertise of European regulators, while maintaining a
democratic and institutional balance (Ibid.: –). The system was agreed
by the ECOFIN Council on  March  and mostly endorsed by the
European Council of Stockholm on – March  and the
European Parliament on  February .
The relevance of the analysis of this new regulatory framework stems
from the fact that it might be considered a model for the transformation
of EU governance in other policy areas, in line with the Commission
White Paper on European Governance (Commission a: –). The
present article seeks to describe and interpret the Lamfalussy reform in
the securities sector from the theoretical perspective developed in the
introduction to this special issue. Our argumentation is structured as
follows. The first section briefly presents the Lamfalussy reform. It
summarises the policy process according to its four-level approach
(CWM : ), presenting the actors and the institutional safeguards.
The second section focuses on the configuration of actors involved in the
Lamfalussy scheme. It sheds light on the fiduciary delegation mech-
anisms, suggesting that both the agency model and the trust model are
useful in understanding the relationships between these actors at the
various decision-making and implementation phases. The third section
formulates three working hypotheses on the policy effectiveness of the
Lamfalussy scheme and the resulting balance of power between the
Commission, the Council and the European Parliament. The first
hypothesis argues that the status quo might continue to prevail if the
member states predominate. In the agency hypothesis, policy effective-
ness should, on the contrary, increase and the balance of power tilt in
favour of the European Parliament. The trust hypothesis also posits an
increase in policy effectiveness, but a balance of power in favour of the
Commission. The fourth section concludes with an initial empirical test
of these three hypotheses.
I The Lamfalussy reform
In its report of  February , the Committee of Wise Men proposed
the introduction of a four-level system for adoption of framework
legislation (level -L), adoption of implementing measures (level -L),
consistent and equivalent implementation (level -L) and monitoring of
the enforcement of the Community legislation in the securities sector
(level -L) (CWM : ). This system is based on the extensive use
Lamfalussy Reform in Securities Markets 
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of comitology and consultation with market practitioners (inter-
mediaries), end-users (issuers of securities) and consumers (investors)
(Lamfalussy : ; CWM : , ).
At L, the initiation phase, the Commission adopts a proposal for a
directive or a regulation after a full consultation process of market actors
(CWM : ). The proposal is thereafter sent to the European
Parliament and the Council, which adopt, according to the co-decision
procedure, the legislative act containing the framework principles and
the definition of the implementing powers to be conferred on the
Commission.
At L, the implementing powers phase, the Commission adopts the
measures implementing the L directive or regulation on the basis of the
comitology process established in Council Decision //EC.
Before proceeding with the elaboration and adoption of L measures, the
Commission first consults the European Securities Committee (ESC),
which is the relevant regulatory committee in the field of securities. The
ESC was created by a Commission decision on  June  (//
EC). In addition to its regulatory committee function, the ESC is also a
policy advisor, notably on projected L legislation and on Commission
services mandates (CWM : , ). The ESC comprises representa-
tives of the member states and is chaired by a representative of the
Commission services. Before the ESC was created, there was no effective
L committee. Next, the Commission also requests advice from the
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), which is an
independent advisory group composed of national regulators designated
by their respective member state. More specifically, following a mandate
granted by the Commission, CESR prepares technical advice in consul-
tation with market practitioners, end-users and consumers, and forwards
it to the Commission. On the basis of this advice, the Commission draws
up draft implementing measures, which are then submitted to the ESC
for vote. The Commission adopts the implementing measures once the
ESC has approved them.
If the ESC does not approve the measures or does not deliver an
opinion, the implementing measures are referred to the Council, which
has two main options. Firstly, it can adopt them by a qualified majority
vote, or not adopt them while not opposing them; in the second case,
the measures are adopted by the Commission. Secondly, the Council
can prevent their adoption by a qualified majority vote. In that case,
the Commission can submit amended implementing measures to the
Council, submit the initial draft measures anew or submit a legislative
proposal to the Council and the European Parliament (Council Decision
//EC, Art. , §§, ). During the L process, the European
Parliament is kept fully informed of the development of the implementing
 Christian de Visscher, Olivier Maiscocq and Fre´de´ric Varone
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measures (CWM : ). In accordance with its right of scrutiny and if
the case arises, the European Parliament can indicate in a resolution that
the draft implementing measures the Commission has submitted to the
ESC for approval exceed the powers conferred on the Commission in
the basic instrument. Such a resolution is, however, not binding, the
Commission being able to continue to request a vote from the ESC
if it deems it necessary (Council Decision //EC, Art. ). The
procedure for regulatory committees adds that the European Parliament
informs the Council of its position, which can take it into account when
deciding whether or not to adopt the referred measures (Art. , §§, ).
The right of scrutiny was explicitly mentioned in the Lamfalussy reform
(Ibid.: ).
At L, the implementation phase, CESR works to ensure that
convergent application and day-to-day practice are established in the
member states. For instance, it issues administrative guidelines, joint
interpretation recommendations and common standards in areas not
covered by Community legislation. CESR was created by a Commission
decision on  June  (//EC). A member of the latter is entitled
to participate in all meetings, unless they deal with confidential matters
(CESR : Art. , §). The work is prepared by expert groups
established on a non-permanent basis and by permanent groups (Ibid.:
Art. , §§, ).
Finally, at L, the enforcement phase, the Commission monitors
consistent transposition and subsequent application of measures adopted
at L and L. The Commission exercises its function as guardian of the
Treaty establishing the European Community by checking the com-
pliance of the member states with Community legislation and, if
necessary, starting proceedings for failure to fulfil an obligation if a
breach is suspected (EC Treaty, Arts. , ; CWM : , , –,
).
The Lamfalussy process was formally extended to banking, insurance
and occupational pensions, and UCITS in , but its application
differs according to the financial sector (IIMG : ; : ). In the
securities sector, four directives have passed through that legislative
process: Transparency (//EC), Prospectus (//EC),
Market Abuse (//EC) and Markets in Financial Instruments
(MiFID; //EC). However, in the banking sector, the activities
of the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) have
concentrated on the implementation at L of the Capital Requirements
Directive (CRD; //EC and //EC), which is not a
Lamfalussy directive. Furthermore, in the insurance sector, the Com-
mittee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors
(CEIOPS) was involved at L in the technical aspects of the Solvency
Lamfalussy Reform in Securities Markets 
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II project, which led to a Lamfalussy directive proposal on  July
.
The final element of the Lamfalussy structure to be established was the
Inter-Institutional Monitoring Group (IIMG), created in July . The
IIMG consists of six independent experts appointed by the Commission,
the Council and the European Parliament (two representatives each).
Its task is to evaluate the implementation of the Lamfalussy process in
terms of effectiveness and detect possible dysfunctions (IIMG : , ).
It produced three reports between  and . Following the
above-mentioned extension of the Lamfalussy process to the other
financial sectors, the IIMG was re-established under an extended
mandate to consider developments in the three sectors (banking, insur-
ance and investment services). The relationships between the actors of
the process is summarised in Figure .
From the point of view of new modes of governance (see He´ritier and
Lehmkuhl, in this issue), in the Lamfalussy process, both public (national
securities regulators) and, to a lesser extent, private actors (market actors)
are entitled to participate in policymaking in a functionally clearly
delimited area, that of securities, later extended to the whole of the
financial services sector. This reform falls within the scope of the 
White Paper on European Governance; it has in addition brought about
adjustments in favour of both the Council and the European Parliament.
Three control mechanisms have been added to the original Lamfalussy
model at L. Firstly, in order to secure an agreement on the Lamfalussy
reform, the Commission reaffirmed to the ECOFIN Council, on 
F . Relationships between policy actors in the Lamfalussy reform
 Christian de Visscher, Olivier Maiscocq and Fre´de´ric Varone
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March , its commitment not to go against ‘ predominant views’
within the Council when passing L measures. This clause is known as
the ‘ aerosol clause’ (IIMG : , ). The European Parliament
considered it was therefore no longer treated on an equal footing with the
Council and requested more rights in addition to its right of scrutiny. A
compromise was reached and confirmed in the declaration by Romano
Prodi, President of the Commission, to the European Parliament on
 February  (Commission a). It was decided, secondly, that each
L directive or regulation adopted under the Lamfalussy process would
include a ‘ sunset clause’, that is to say, a clause limiting to four years
(from the entry into force of the directive or regulation) the time the
Commission has to exercise implementing powers. Thirdly, it was agreed
that the European Parliament would have a three-month period (except
in urgent cases) from the transmission of any draft implementing
measures to react to them and, if need be, indicate that they exceed the
implementing powers delegated to the Commission. The European
Parliament would also continue having a one-month period (except in
urgent cases), from the transmission of final draft measures, to indicate
that the Commission has exceeded its implementing powers. However,
it was not granted the ‘ call-back right’ it regarded as the equivalent of the
aerosol clause for the Council. That right would have allowed the
European Parliament to block the adoption of implementing measures
(IIMG : –, –). A provision granting a general call-back
right to the European Parliament was inserted in the  Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe (Art. I-, §(a)), but due to its
rejection in France ( May ) and the Netherlands ( June ) it
had not entered into force. As a result, new discussions between the
Commission, the Council and the European Parliament on the reform of
comitology started in September , leading to the creation of a
new type of comitology committee, the ‘ regulatory procedure with
scrutiny committee’ (Council Decision //EC, Art. , §). This
type of committee gives the European Parliament the right to oppose
the adoption of draft measures implementing directives or regulations
adopted under the co-decision procedure. The deadline for such
a decision is three months following the referral to the European
Parliament of measures approved by the regulatory committee with
scrutiny, or four months following the referral to the Council of measures
which were not approved or on which the committee did not deliver an
opinion. It applies only to future directives. In order to apply this
procedure to already existing directives, the Council and the European
Parliament have called upon the Commission to come forward with an
alignment proposal. The new procedure, establishing equal control rights
for these two institutions, renders the use of sunset clauses unnecessary.
Lamfalussy Reform in Securities Markets 
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II Interpreting the new regulatory framework: agency or trust modes of delegation?
The following section seeks to identify whether the relationships between
the actors involved in the securities regulation after the Lamfalussy
reform occur within an agency or trust model.
There are two reasons for choosing these approaches. Firstly, the
Lamfalussy reform develops the practice of delegation of tasks, on
account of the technicality of securities policy. For that purpose, the
Commission relies on the advice of the ESC and CESR acting within
their respective ambit. Secondly, agency and trust are two basic modes of
delegation, which are complementary approaches to the study of EU
governance: ‘ while agency theory can be legitimately used to analyse the
comitology system – i.e. the system of control by committees of national
representatives – in areas where the Commission has been delegated
implementing powers . . . the same theory cannot satisfactorily explain
the treaty-based independence of the Commission in initiating legislation
and in monitoring compliance with European law by the member states.
The real purpose of delegating such autonomous powers, it should be
noted, is to enhance the credibility of the member states’ commitment to
the integration process’ (Majone : ).
Methodologically speaking, the agency and trust models view actors as
acting as a whole; this does not mean that before reaching a decision
institutions are not subject to diverging interests. For instance, the
Council may experience struggles between member states, each repre-
senting the financial interests of its own companies. Key centres such as
London, Paris, Frankfurt and Amsterdam are in competition with each
other. Furthermore, London, the most important of them, sees itself as a
wholesale market for professionals competing in a global market place;
this gives it a different perspective on regulation when compared with
member states where the regulator is concerned with domestic retail
investors.
. Agency relationship
Agency theory is derived from the law of contracts. Under the American
Third Restatement of the Law of Agency, agency is defined as ‘ the
fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘ ‘ principal’’)
manifests assent to another person (an ‘ ‘ agent’’) that the agent shall act
on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the
agent manifests consent or otherwise consents so to act’ (§()). The fact
that agency is a fiduciary relationship implies that the interest of the
principal prevails over that of the agent.
The concept of agency was applied in economics (Berhold ) and
political science (Mitnick ) in the s (Kiser : ; Shapiro
 Christian de Visscher, Olivier Maiscocq and Fre´de´ric Varone
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: ). Several political situations can be characterised as principal-
agent relationships. For example, the ideal type of parliamentary
democracy has been illustrated by a chain of delegation and account-
ability between principals and agents (Strøm : –). Agency
theorists usually discuss two main types of agency loss. Because of hidden
information, principals may select agents who have preferences that are
bound to conflict with theirs (problem of adverse selection). Because their
action may also be hidden while in office, agents may not have been
penalised for acting to the detriment of the principal’s welfare (problem
of moral hazard). Thus, the asymmetry of information between the
principal and the agent allows the latter to engage in non-fiduciary
behaviour (shirking) that is harmful to the principal and, at the same
time, difficult to detect (Kassim and Menon : ). To prevent such
behaviour, political actors are likely to design specific institutional rules
and arrangements guiding delegation and accountability. These devices
include both ex ante contract design and agent’s screening, and ex post
monitoring and sanctions (Pollack : –).
At first sight, the general framework of principal-agent theory seems
appropriate to describe the content of the Lamfalussy reform. Broadly
speaking, one could argue that, firstly, the Council (principal P) and the
European Parliament (principal P) delegate implementing powers to
the Commission (agent A) at L, by assigning it the implementation of
the regulatory measures decided at L, which also define the limits of this
delegation. Structurally, this represents a case of dual agency (d), that is,
an agency relationship where the agent has two principals (Gregory :
, ). Secondly, the Commission (while keeping its right of initiative)
as a principal (P), delegates, at L, advisory and approval tasks
respectively to CESR and the ESC, which are involved in the definition
of the technical measures of implementation. That level of delegation
constitutes sub-agency (s), in so far as CESR (sub-agent A) and the ESC
(sub-agent A) are the agents of an intermediate agent, the Commission,
and the sub-agents of ultimate principals, the Council and the European
Parliament, to which they are accountable. This is represented by
Figure .
When looking more closely at the relationship between the actors, four
questions arise regarding the appropriateness of the agency model as a
tool with which to study the Lamfalussy process. Firstly, at L the
Commission is the agent of the Council and the European Parliament,
which determine the limits of the delegated powers in the L directive or
regulation. Nevertheless, it has the right of initiative at L and monitors
the implementation at L. The Commission thus benefits from a
substantial autonomy vis-a`-vis its principals, which seems contradictory
to the control dimension of the agency relationship.
Lamfalussy Reform in Securities Markets 
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Secondly, the Commission grants a mandate to CESR for advice on the
drafting of technical measures. However, the Commission’s means of
control over CESR are relatively limited. As noted earlier, the political
approach of agency identifies two types of ex post control of the agent:
monitoring and sanctions.
In terms of monitoring, Commission representatives participate in the
CESR expert groups during the preparation of the L advice, but their
role consists in ‘ informing the members of the political priorities,
discussing emerging ideas’ (CWM : ), not in directing the drafting
of the advice. This reduces the Commission’s ability to take a monitoring
role.
In terms of sanctions, four general means are at the disposal of the
principal: unilateral refusal of compliance with the agent’s decision;
adoption of new legislation overruling the agent’s action; dismissal or
reappointment of the agent’s personnel; and cuts in the agent’s budget
(Pollack : –). Firstly, the Commission can unilaterally refuse to
comply with CESR’s advice. Implementing measures are drafted exclu-
sively by the Commission services, possibly without taking account of
CESR’s advice, which is not binding. However, this mechanism is less
probable given that, on the one hand, the decision to resort to the
Lamfalussy process is a Commission decision on account of its right of
initiative at L and, on the other hand, this would jeopardise the smooth
working of the implementation process on account of CESR’s role at
L. Secondly, the Commission could submit to the Council and the
European Parliament a new legislative proposal revising the content
F . A ﬁrst look at the Lamfalussy reform (L and L): agency relationship
 Christian de Visscher, Olivier Maiscocq and Fre´de´ric Varone
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of CESR’s advice. This control option is unlikely given that the
Commission can simply refuse to comply with the advice. Finally, control
by the Commission is also limited by the fact that it cannot dismiss
or reappoint members of CESR and has no competence over its
financing, which is provided by the member states (CESR : Art. ,
§). As a result, it is clear that CESR does not act as an agent of the
Commission.
Thirdly, the Commission also delegates to the ESC the approval of
the draft implementing measures designed by the Commission after the
advice of CESR (this is the function of the ESC as a regulatory
committee), as well as the possibility of influencing the L mandates of
CESR (CWM : ). The Commission has two means of controlling
the ESC.
In contrast to its restricted monitoring role in CESR, the
Commission’s ESC representative, the director-general of the DG
Internal Market, is the chairman of the Committee and submits draft
measures to the Committee. This provides the Commission with a
control mechanism over the ESC (Dehousse : ).
Of the four means of sanction the principal has over the agent listed
above, the Commission can make use of only one in its dealings with
the ESC: it can affect the latter’s budget when it drafts that of the
Community. As far as the other three measures are concerned, the
Commission cannot simply disregard an unfavourable ESC vote on its
draft measures, because under these circumstances these measures are
automatically transmitted to the Council. Secondly, the Commission
cannot overrule the decision of the ESC; it can submit a new legislative
proposal, but this would have to be approved by the European
Parliament as well as the Council. Finally, the Commission does not
appoint the members of the ESC, who are representatives of the member
states. In conclusion, control instruments of the Commission over the
ESC exist, but are limited.
A general argument on comitology posits a reverse control relation-
ship: that is, the direction of control is from comitology committees
towards the Commission. This would weaken that conclusion. The
rationale of this argument is that – given that all members of the
comitology committees except the Commission representative are
appointed by the member states and that the type of comitology
procedure, leaving more or less autonomy to the Commission, is chosen
by the Council and the European Parliament (Pollack : ) – these
committees are police-patrol agents of the Council overseeing the
Commission (Ibid.: ; Dehousse : ). In , the first year of
comitology before the term had been coined, there was indeed rivalry
between national administrations and the Commission (Bergstro¨m :
Lamfalussy Reform in Securities Markets 
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
01
43
81
4X
08
00
07
67
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
as
el
 L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
11
 Ju
l 2
01
7 
at
 1
1:
06
:2
6,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
–), but the situation quickly evolved towards co-operation. Data on
the working of committees indicate only a very small number of referrals
to the Council, suggesting that comitology committees (including the
ESC) are not active watchdogs for the Council. Instead, they are pools
of experts co-operating with the Commission, while providing, if needed,
an institutional location in which member states may express their
national interests (Dehousse : ). Therefore, the assumption of a
sub-agency relationship between the Commission and the ESC is not
invalidated in so far as there seems to be some control by the Commission
through its chairmanship and its monopoly on the initiative at L. In
other words, the ESC can be considered an agent both of the Council (as
a safety net for expressing vital national interests) and of the Commission
(by approving its draft implementing measures and advising it on the L
mandates of CESR).
Fourthly, the agency pattern does not cover one of the main innovations
of the Lamfalussy reform, namely the role of CESR at L, which is
supposed to ‘ act alone as a fully independent committee of national
regulators’ (CWM : ). This leads us to the second mode of fiduciary
delegation.
. Trust relationship
The trust is a legal concept from equity (Hayton : ); it is applied in
common law regimes and some variations can be found in civil law. It
can be defined as ‘ the legal relationships created – inter vivos or on
death – by a person, the settlor, when assets have been placed under the
control of a trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary or for a specified
purpose’. The trust differs from agency in three notable aspects: the
scope of the fiduciary relationship, the content of delegation and control
over the fiduciary. Firstly, while the agent acts for the benefit of the
principal, i.e. the one who delegates, the trustee, who is the equivalent of
the agent, acts for the benefit of a beneficiary, not of the settlor, unless the
latter is also the beneficiary. This implies that the intent of the settlor is
not to obtain a return for himself/herself as is the case for the principal
(DeMott : –; Gregory : ; Pettit : , ), but to
transfer that return to other persons (the beneficiaries). Secondly, what is
delegated in the trust is not empowerment in an area, but management
of property rights. Thirdly, whereas the control exercised over the agent
by the principal/beneficiary is substantial (Gregory : ), the control
exercised over the trustee by the beneficiary, joint trustees and, in some
specific cases, the settlor is limited. Control in a trust mainly uses
compliance with duties through suits, while control in agency also takes
place through instructions from the principal (see DeMott : , n. ,
 Christian de Visscher, Olivier Maiscocq and Fre´de´ric Varone
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–; Hayton : , , –, –; Pettit : , –, –,
; and Smith : , n. ).
Applying the concept of trust to EU governance, Giandomenico
Majone (: –) argues that political property rights (policy-
making rights), which include elements of national sovereignty, are
transferred from the member states to Community institutions for the
benefit of the former. This is the case for example with the European
Central Bank, whose role consists in preserving the property rights of
the member states in the area of monetary policy. Similarly, some
provisions of the EC Treaty provide the Commission with property
rights, such as the right of initiative, in order to safeguard the acquis
communautaire. Majone adds that the main difference between the
situation of the agent and the trustee is their level of independence
with regard to the principal or settlor respectively. Contrary to the
agency relationship, where the agent’s preferences must be in line with
those of the principal in order to avoid or minimise agency losses, in
the case of a trust relationship, these preferences have to be different
from those of the settlor, to ensure the credibility of the policy
proposals put forward by the trustee.
Based on this analysis, the trust approach can help understand the
three unsolved problems mentioned above. Firstly, the apparent paradox
of the Commission – being on the one hand controlled by the Council
and the European Parliament when being delegated implementing
powers at L and, on the other hand, independent at L and controlling
the member states at L – can be explained by the assertion of double
mandate. The Commission fulfils two functions: one of agent of the
Council (and thus the member states acting through that Community
institution) and the European Parliament in a dual agency relationship
at L, and one of trustee (T) of the member states (its settlors, S) at
L and L, acting for the benefit of the EU citizens and organisations
(the beneficiaries, B) in a trust relationship (t). This is illustrated in
Figure .
Next, the role of CESR does not currently fit into the agency model on
account of its independence from the Commission. This issue can be
explained by looking at the role of CESR at L; the third problem,
regarding the interpretation of L, can also be answered in this way.
Firstly, CESR is made up of representatives of the national authorities for
the regulation of securities, who are designated by the member states.
Next, at L, those representatives exercise competences they have at the
national level, i.e. setting up guidelines and regulatory practices for
nationwide actors. As a result, it could be argued that the Committee
plays a role of trustee (T) of the member states (its settlors, S), managing
the assets that national regulatory competences constitute, for the benefit
Lamfalussy Reform in Securities Markets 
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of market participants (practitioners, end-users and consumers – the
beneficiaries, B). Figure  encapsulates this.

III Working hypotheses for the empirical analysis
It becomes clear from the preceding theoretical discussion that several
hypotheses have to be taken into account when evaluating the potential
benefits of the Lamfalussy reform. Our research has allowed us to further
investigate these hypotheses regarding the benefits of the Lamfalussy
reform (in this section) and to test them through an empirical analysis (in
the next section). By benefits, we mean the potential contribution of the
reform to the policy effectiveness in the securities sector as well as its
consequences on the balance of power between the Community
institutions.
. The status quo hypothesis: member states’ predominance
This first hypothesis could be referred to as the status quo option: some
observers (Grossman ; Hertig and Lee ) are sceptical about the
alleged benefits of the new framework. In their opinion, the Council and
the European Parliament will continue to disagree on the principles and
the scope of delegation to the Commission because financial regulation
F . A second look at the Lamfalussy reform (L, L and L): trust
relationship and revised agency relationship
 Christian de Visscher, Olivier Maiscocq and Fre´de´ric Varone
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remains a very sensitive issue in many national contexts. As a result,
the comitology system will not function more rapidly or smoothly. On the
contrary, with the aerosol clause, greater veto power is given to the
Council to block the implementing measures of the Commission.
Overall, the new process will not succeed in improving policy
effectiveness – notably reducing excessive delays in the implementation of
Community law – and the balance of power between the three main
Community institutions will not change significantly since each will stick
to its prerogatives.
The following arguments support this hypothesis. Firstly, it follows
from the main objective of the new system in terms of speed and
flexibility that excessive details should be avoided at L. The legislator
(the Council and the European Parliament) should adopt general
principles at L, leaving it to the Commission to decide on the technical
details, after consultation with the ESC and CESR and informing the
European Parliament. However, despite the fact that market actors have
greater access to information through the consultation process organised
F . A third look at the Lamfalussy reform (all levels): revised trust and agency
relationships
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by the Commission at L and through CESR at L, interest groups will
probably continue lobbying at L, aiming to have the technical details
already regulated at that level. Secondly, although the global reaction to
the new Lamfalussy process has been positive, it remains an open
question how enthusiastic the member states really are about it. Thirdly,
opening up the consultation process does not prevent member states from
agreeing upon policy decisions before that process is closed as in the case
of the Market Abuse Directive (Grossman : ). The IIMG also
reports that market participants ‘ want more transparency with regard to
the Council and the European Securities Committee; two rounds of
consultation; and more extensive and convincing feedback statements so
that consultation is demonstrably a genuine dialogue’ (: ).
. The agency relationship hypothesis: Commission as agent, ESC as
sub-agent
A second hypothesis – called the Lamfalussy hypothesis because it was
the one the Group of Wise Men had in mind – consists in interpreting the
Lamfalussy scheme purely and simply as a method of delegation in line
with agency theory. The new four-level approach is expected to enhance
the overall policy effectiveness in the securities sector, provided that the
risk of agency loss is well under control. The argument of the Committee
of Wise Men (CWM : –) is summed up as follows:
() The legislative process would speed up – because the key Level 
political co-decision negotiations between the Commission, the
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament would focus
solely on the essential issues and not on technical implementing
details. As the section on Level  shows, the process of updating
technical details would also be speeded up.
() The process would be democratic and ﬂexible – with the range and scope of
implementing powers being defined by the Council of Ministers and
the European Parliament by co-decision on a case by case basis for
each Level  proposal.
() The EU institutions would be able to benefit from the technical and
regulatory expertise of European regulators, with the European
Commission fully retaining its right of initiative.
As regards the balance of power, the new process is likely to strengthen
the position of the European Parliament to some extent. As mentioned in
section I, some safeguards have been built into the process at L, in order
to provide the European Parliament with control over the implementing
measures (a three-month period in which to react to these measures, and
 Christian de Visscher, Olivier Maiscocq and Fre´de´ric Varone
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sunset clauses). The new reform of comitology, leading to the creation of
a call-back right, seems to reinforce this shift of power towards the
European Parliament.
. The trust relationship hypothesis: Commission and CESR as trustees
A third hypothesis assumes that the Commission and CESR, or CESR
alone, by increasing their autonomy, will in the long run move to a
position as trustee of the member states. Two basic arguments are
advanced to support this hypothesis.
One could reasonably expect that, in highly technical matters such as
the securities markets, the experts of the Commission (DG Internal
Market) will progressively form an ‘ epistemic community’ with the
national regulators and the market actors (Wilks : ), which will
be on an equal footing with the member states and the European
Parliament. The Lamfalussy process even reinforces this ‘ deliberative
autonomy’ since the Commission and CESR control the chain of
command in the tasks of initiating, implementing and monitoring
legislation. More generally, for Stephen Wilks (Ibid.: ), the Commis-
sion as a guardian of the EC Treaty has gained considerable power so
that it has become less vulnerable to the sanctions of its principals.
Revising the agent’s mandate could thus be very costly for them.
But one could take this approach a step further by putting forward that
some political property rights have already been transferred from the
member states to the Commission and CESR. Substantial powers have
indeed been assigned to the Commission by the EC Treaty (right of
initiative at L, control of compliance with Community legislation at L)
in order to protect the interests of the EU citizens and organisations.
We may also infer from the Lamfalussy structure that CESR has
inherited some political property rights from the member states at the
implementation level since CESR – instead of the national regulatory
authorities – is supposed to play a significant role at L. Moreover, as
mentioned in section II, CESR does not actively behave as a guardian of
national interests, but takes its decisions by consensus for the benefit of
market participants.
In terms of policy effectiveness, a trustee relationship would probably
produce effects similar to the second hypothesis (more transparency
through extensive consultation, an increase in the speed of the decision-
making process, etc.). But the balance of power in this case would
probably be, as mentioned above, in favour of the Commission.
As a synthesis of this theoretical discussion, Table  indicates the
impact of the Lamfalussy reform that can be expected from alternative
theoretical approaches.
Lamfalussy Reform in Securities Markets 
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IV Empirical test of the hypotheses
In order to empirically test the plausibility of the three research
hypotheses presented above, about fifteen interviews were conducted
with representatives of CESR, the Commission (DG Internal Market),
the Council, the ESC, the European Parliament and the IIMG, and with
members of the permanent representations of four member states,
selected according to the main schools of regulation. The topics discussed
with these actors focused mainly on the actual relationships between the
Community institutions, the ESC and CESR, and on the first tangible
impacts of the Lamfalussy reform on the regulation of the securities
markets (for instance, assessment of the decision-making process and
outputs of the directives adopted after the Lamfalussy reform). In
addition, a roundtable took place in Brussels with some of these
representatives to draw out further details of their points of view.
Evidence from the  and  reports of the IIMG and the first part
of the Commission FSAP evaluation (Commission b) was also added
to these sources.
Firstly, and contrary to the expectations of the intergovernmentalist
school of thought which predicted a failure in the implementation of the
process (Hertig and Lee : –), there is now widespread agree-
ment among the interested parties that the Lamfalussy approach has
fulfilled its general purpose, providing an appropriate process for passing
primary and secondary legislation in the securities field. The Lamfalussy
process has created a political momentum that has speeded up the
adoption of the FSAP, even if there are still several unresolved issues or
criticism surrounding the new procedure. Similarly, the ongoing process
has not strengthened the influence of the member states. For these
reasons, the status quo hypothesis should be ruled out.
At this point, we suggest making a distinction between the policy
outcome at L and L on the one hand, and at L on the other.
Secondly, evidence based on the four Lamfalussy directives seems to
validate the second hypothesis, the agency relationship. Thanks to
extensive and frequent consultation with experts, the Lamfalussy process
T . Hypotheses on the implications of the Lamfalussy reform
Hypothesis/dependent variable Policy effectiveness Balance of power between EC institutions
Status quo: member states’
predominance
Unchanged Unchanged
Agency: Commission as agent,
ESC and CESR as sub-agents
Increased Tilted in favour of the European
Parliament
Trust: Commission and CESR as
trustees
Increased Tilted in favour of the Commission
 Christian de Visscher, Olivier Maiscocq and Fre´de´ric Varone
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has indeed reduced the average time taken to negotiate and adopt the
first framework directives at L, compared to the normal co-decision
procedure (Commission b: ). In this sense, we may conclude
that delegation has enhanced policy effectiveness in the securities
sector.
According to Council and Commission officials, the adoption of the
market abuse, prospectus and MiFID directives at L went relatively
swiftly. Thus, the Lamfalussy reform’s positive results have included
deep, technical, enlarged consultation within the decision process itself.
If consultations make the decision-making process more transparent
(almost anybody can voice an opinion when consultations are carried
out), the downside is that there is a lot of information to be sorted out. A
second problem in the new process is how to distinguish between
framework legislation, which should be adopted at L, and technical
measures, which should be adopted at L (IIMG : –; Avgerinos
: –). A third negative outcome is that, with the creation of the
new regulatory procedure with scrutiny (see section I), the issue of the
distinction between framework legislation and technical measures has
been added, at L, regarding L measures themselves. Indeed, the
Council and the European Parliament, when co-deciding on a directive
or regulation in the field, will have to determine, following the adoption
of alignment proposals, whether or not measures implementing that L
instrument are to be considered of quasi-legislative nature or not. This
approach is meant to ensure that the European Parliament, as a
co-legislator, is on a par with the Council when the nature of the
implementing measures legitimates its involvement with an eye on the
institutional balance (Christiansen and Vaccari : –).
Things went equally smoothly at L, even in the case of the MiFID,
given that projects of such magnitude usually either take ten years to be
adopted or are never approved. It is worth noting that the Commission
does not always closely follow the advice of CESR (IIMG : , ).
For instance, in the case of the MiFID, the Commission decided to
substantially change the advice because it was too long and too detailed
to be incorporated in the directive.
The Lamfalussy reform did not seem, at first, to have changed the
balance of power dramatically at L and L. The European Parliament
increased its control over the ESC through the institution of a three-
month period to react to draft implementing measures and through
sunset clauses, but cannot veto implementing measures. However, the
institutional changes brought by the reform might have reinforced the
determination of the European Parliament to request a greater involve-
ment in comitology. The result was a call-back right for the implementing
measures adopted under the regulatory procedure with scrutiny, which is
Lamfalussy Reform in Securities Markets 
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meant to be applied not only to the Lamfalussy directives, but also to
other areas (other financial matters, environment, health and the
movement of persons across borders). This provides the European
Parliament with potentially substantial influence at L. Nevertheless, it
remains the case that the European Parliament is not directly involved in
the working of the ESC and that it can be quite difficult for its members
to scrutinise all the technical details of the securities legislation. Most
interviewees think that it is in fact the Commission that has gained a
great deal of power. At L, it has the right of initiative; at L, it has
a preponderant role because it drafts the proposals, controls the
consultation process and chairs the meetings of the ESC. Nevertheless,
notwithstanding this increase in power, there can be no doubt that to a
large extent the Commission remains accountable to its principals,
namely the Council and the European Parliament, and that it should be
considered an agent, not a trustee, of the latter.
In the third place, it is far more difficult to assess the validity of the
trustee hypothesis, i.e. whether the Commission and CESR, or CESR
alone, in fact, act as trustees of the member states at L. The problem
here is that the process is completely new and that, in future, CESR’s
autonomy vis-a`-vis the member states will depend on several factors such
as external events (competition between financial centres) and CESR’s
internal organisation and dynamics as well as its funding. CESR indeed
reported to the IIMG ‘ difficulties related to a lack of means to finance
cooperation tools foreseen in Level  legislation’ (IIMG : ). In
addition, even if the common approaches defined by the members of
CESR already have an influence on day-to-day supervision, their effect is
still not binding (CESR : ). Similarly, if CESR has started using
majority rules, development of its competences requires a proposal
from the Commission to be adopted by the Council and the European
Parliament (Ibid.: , –). It is, however, uncertain whether member
states are inclined to grant it additional competences and funding, and
see it evolving into a European regulatory agency.
The increased autonomy of CESR is subject to both the will of the
member states and the balance of power between Community institu-
tions. Referring to the latter, the European Parliament has expressed
concerns about the lack of transparency stemming from the ‘ discretion-
ary’ powers of CESR at L and has requested a strengthening of its
oversight on the activities of the Committee. As a result, CESR accepted
in September  that it should regularly inform the Committee on
Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament on its
activities at L (European Parliament ). The DG Internal Market
took account of that balance when mentioning in a working document
on the application of the Lamfalussy process that ‘Level  must evolve in
 Christian de Visscher, Olivier Maiscocq and Fre´de´ric Varone
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a carefully modulated, open and transparent environment that fully respects
Institutional boundaries and the importance of democratic account-
ability. CESR standards adopted at Level  must be fully compatible
with – and cannot substitute for – binding EU legislation at Levels 
and . They should not prejudice the political process, nor the Institu-
tional prerogatives of the Parliament, the Council or the Commission’
(Commission : , point ).
Conclusion
The three main innovations of the Lamfalussy reform are: firstly, the
distinction between framework principles (L) and implementing
measures (L); secondly, the creation of CESR and its systematic
consultation of market actors at L; and, thirdly, the introduction of a
third level to ensure the consistent and equivalent implementation of
securities legislation. Regarding the decision-making framework already
present before the reform, our argument is that it resembles an agency
relationship between the Commission on the one hand, and the Council
and the European Parliament on the other. However, the Commission
has another mandate towards the member states, that of trustee,
consisting in exercising attributes of sovereignty (right of legislative
initiative and implementation monitoring) for the benefit of EU citizens
and organisations. Regarding the new elements of the process, the
Commission sub-delegates to the ESC the right of advice on L mandates
and approval of L draft measures; contrary to what has been contended,
the ESC has the features not only of an agent of the Council, but also of
an agent of the Commission. As regards the role of CESR, it turns out to
be impossible to integrate into an agency model that has the Commission
as a principal. We therefore suggest that it is appropriate to consider
CESR to be a trustee of the member states, delegating to the Committee
the management of ‘ regulatory assets’ for the benefit of the market
actors.
By introducing a new mode of governance, the Community institutions
have succeeded in reducing to a large extent the backlog in the securities
markets regulation. Co-operation with market actors and national
supervisors has increased overall policy effectiveness. Empirical studies
provided by the Commission (Commission b) and the IIMG (IIMG
, , , ) suggest that the speed of the process has
increased overall and that there are fewer bottlenecks than before in the
different steps leading to the adoption of legislation. There is also more
consistency in the proposals submitted by the Commission to the Council
and the European Parliament, thanks to extensive consultation. In sum,
the Lamfalussy process has brought about more transparency and more
Lamfalussy Reform in Securities Markets 
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expertise in the policy process and might also contribute to the
emergence of a common culture of supervision in the securities sector. As
far as benefits for the markets are concerned, the policy effectiveness and
political momentum created by the institutional reform should be
considered in parallel with the increased efficiency of EU securities
markets – measured by their innovation capacity – which was gener-
ated by the deregulatory content of the Community policy itself
(Gkantinis : –, , –, , ), developed following the White
Paper on the Internal Market (Commission : ).
The Lamfalussy reform proposed a new process and is recent. We are
aware that our assertions on policy effectiveness and balance of power
thus remain debatable. The system is still in flux, as indicated by the
blurring of the boundary between L and L in the activities of CEIOPS
(in the framework of the Solvency II project); the IIMG wondered
whether in future L committees should be empowered to propose
amendments to legal texts (IIMG : , ). This observation also
emerges from the various questions that are still unsolved at all four levels
(Ibid.: , –). Among these questions, two can be singled out. Firstly,
resourcing has arisen as an important issue in the functioning of CESR,
the IIMG emphasising that ‘ the budget constraint appears to be real and a
prerequisite for further development is that it is solved’ (Ibid.: ). Additional
financial means for CESR, and more generally for L committees, could
indeed contribute to the overcoming of distrust between member states,
and ensuring a co-operative relationship between the Commission and
these committees.
Secondly, the new call-back right raises the question of whether it will
have an impact on the functioning of the Lamfalussy structure and, more
broadly, the Community process, either through its effective use or
through disputes on its choice in legislative instruments. That impact
depends on whether the European Parliament will in future use its new
right actively, as it did with the right of co-decision, or less frequently, as
it did with the right of scrutiny. Indeed, the European Parliament fully
used its new right of co-decision to gain new powers in comitology,
namely the right of scrutiny (Bergstro¨m : –). However, the use
it has made of this right has been limited. As contemplated in a GAIN
report of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA : ),
the European Parliament could threaten to use its new comitology right
if the Commission does not change its plans to draft implementing
measures giving food companies two years to adapt their nutrition
and health claims aimed at children to the new rules of Regulation
//EC of  December  (Art. , §) (Taylor ).
The Commission alignment proposal required to grant the European
Parliament a call-back right in that regulation has not yet, however, been
 Christian de Visscher, Olivier Maiscocq and Fre´de´ric Varone
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adopted. The next steps in this dispute will indicate towards which kind
of use the European Parliament is heading.
NOTES
. The authors would like to thank Alexandre Lamfalussy, Jo¨rn-Carsten Gottwald, Daniel Mu¨gge,
Emiliano Grossman, officials of the Commission and the Council, members of the Committee of
European Securities Regulators, of the European Parliament and of European permanent
representations to the European Union, and the Journal of Public Policy peer-reviewer for their
helpful comments.
. The single market was almost achieved for the banking sector, some barriers remaining to the
provision of cross-border services and the implementation of Directive //EC being delayed
until  June . As far as the insurance sector is concerned, it was achieved in most member
states on  July , thus with a delay of eighteen months. The investment services sector was the
last sector in which integration was achieved, with a delay of three years. Compliance with the last
directive adopted (Directive //EEC) was required by  December .
. The group was created in January  at the request of the European Council of Vienna. It was
composed of personal representatives of the EU finance ministers and of the European Central
Bank, of the director-general of the Directorate General (DG) G – Economic and Social Affairs of
the Council, and of the internal market commissioner, which held the chairmanship.
. This committee was to be set up in accordance with Article , §(b) of Directive //EEC of 
May  on investment services in the securities field.
. ‘ Mostly’ because the final report of the Committee of Wise Men as adopted by the European
Council was slightly revised; an ‘ aerosol clause’ was introduced (see section I) (Lamfalussy : ,
, ).
. The European Parliament ‘ recommends that the ‘ ‘ better regulation’’ programme be piloted in
certain fields and be carefully assessed before wider use; considers the experience with the
Lamfalussy procedure in financial markets legislation, and the dialogue between regulators and
market participants, in particular, to be a valuable test case for a dynamic legislative process’
(European Parliament : point ). It should, however, be stressed that the Lamfalussy approach
‘ is not the result of putting into practice pre-conceived ideas about the generally desirable features
of European governance’ (Lamfalussy : ) and was thus not initially meant to be extended to
other policy areas.
. The term delegation will be used in a non-juridical sense, to refer to the general transfer of tasks.
. For practical reasons, we use the term level according to the original language of the Lamfalussy
reform. However, the four levels identified in the Community vocabulary correspond de facto to
the subsequent phases of the classic policymaking cycle.
. Comitology refers to the procedures used for the exercise of implementing powers granted by the
Council to the Commission, assisted by a committee, in accordance with Article , third indent,
of the Treaty establishing the European Community (EC Treaty) as revised by the Treaty of Nice.
. See the end of this section on changes brought by Council Decision //EC.
. Comitology includes four procedures: an advisory procedure, a management procedure, a
regulatory procedure and a regulatory procedure with scrutiny. This last procedure was added by
Council Decision //EC. The ESC is then meant to become a ‘ regulatory procedure with
scrutiny committee’ in the ‘ Lamfalussy directives’.
. Two formal contact committees existed: the Securities Contact Committee () and the
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) Contact Committee
() (Commission b: , –, ; Moloney : –, ). Both committees had an
advisory function. The Securities Contact Committee had a comitology function (Directive
//EEC, Art. ), which was never exercised. Similarly, the UCITS Contact Committee was
given a comitology function in  (Directive //EC, Art. , §); however, it only held one
meeting in , without adopting implementing measures (Commission b: –; d: ).
Its functions were later transferred to the ESC (Commission a: ; Commission Decision
//EC, Art. ).
. Website of the European Commission – Prelex, ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real. cfm?
CL = en&DosId = .
. ‘ Given the fact that the Council of Ministers, European Commission and the European Parliament
have equivalent stakes in the process, the Committee suggests that the Monitoring Group should be
Lamfalussy Reform in Securities Markets 
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composed of two external nominees (i.e. not drawn from the membership of the Institutions) of the
Council, European Parliament, and the European Commission’ (CWM : ).
. There was opposition, notably from the German government, regarding the unchanged application
of the comitology procedure to L (Quaglia : ).
. ‘ From a historical point of view, predominant views might be interpreted as a simple majority of
Member States. For the time being, this is not established in law’ (IIMG : ).
. This is in accordance with the agreement between the Commission and the European Parliament
in Decision //EC (Commission a: points  and ).
. ‘ The rejection of the proposed Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands has
implications for the Lamfalussy approach . . . in that it delays an institutional solution to the
European Parliament’s request to have equivalent control powers as its co-legislator’ (Commission
c: ).
. A group called ‘ Friends of the Presidency’ was set up by the British Presidency of the Council in
September  to discuss the reform of comitology (Commission b: ). The idea of this reform
is not connected to the Lamfalussy reform; it was initiated by the Commission in its White Paper
on European Governance (Commission a: ).
. These deadlines can be extended by one month or curtailed on the grounds of efficiency or urgency.
. ‘ However, where an adaptation is necessary within a specified period, the European Parliament,
the Council and the Commission consider that a clause requesting the Commission to submit a
proposal to revise or abrogate the provisions concerning the delegation of implementing powers
could strengthen the scrutiny exercised by the legislator’ (Commission d: point ).
. The term person refers both to natural and legal persons (Gregory : –).
. A ﬁduciary relationship is a relationship in which ‘ one party (the ‘ ‘ fiduciary’’) acts on behalf of another
party (the ‘ ‘ beneficiary’’) while exercising discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to the
beneficiary’ (Smith : ). The ‘ on behalf of’ characteristic distinguishes a fiduciary
relationship from other delegation relationships. For instance, the landlord–tenant relationship
contains the two other characteristics: discretion of the tenant over a critical resource of the
landlord, the rental property. However, the tenant does not manage the property primarily for the
benefit of the landlord (Ibid.: –).
. Implementing powers are conferred on the Commission by the Council – not by the European
Parliament (Art. , third indent of the EC Treaty) – acting according to the procedure laid down
in the Treaty for the matters dealt with, here the co-decision procedure. This procedure means that,
although the Council can choose to delegate implementing powers or not, it has to reach an
agreement about that choice with the European Parliament (Commission c: ). Failing such
agreement, the L measures cannot be adopted.
. Dual agency is a case of what the political economy literature calls ‘ common agency’, i.e. ‘ a
multilateral relationship in which several principals simultaneously try to influence the actions of
an agent’ (Dixit, Grossman and Helpman : ). In that conceptual framework, the Lamfalussy
process involves a delegated common agency, where ‘ several parties voluntarily . . . bestow the right
to make certain decisions upon a single (common) agent’ (Bernheim and Whinston : ).
. Approval differs from adoption: the ESC delivers an opinion on the draft implementing measures
drawn up by the Commission. The latter then adopts them if the opinion is positive, in accordance
with the regulatory procedure (with scrutiny).
. A sub-agent is ‘ a person appointed by an agent . . . empowered to do so, to perform functions
undertaken by the agent . . . for the principal . . . but for whose conduct the agent . . . agrees with
the principal . . . to be primarily responsible’ (Restatement (Second) of Agency, §, quoted in
Gregory : ).
. ‘ The sub-agent differs from other agents only in that he acts for and has duties of loyalty to two
principals [intermediate agent and ultimate principal] who do not employ him jointly’ (Gregory
: ).
. ‘ Control is a defining feature in the legal definition of agency. A principal has the right on a
continuing basis to control the methods by which the agent achieves results, as opposed to the right
simply to assess the results achieved against benchmarks established by contract’ (DeMott :
).
. The fact that the ESC exercises the role of a regulatory committee is decided by the Council and
the European Parliament in each Lamfalussy directive (Commission a: , ). The Council and
the European Parliament, as ultimate principals, thus give their consent to the sub-agency as
regards both its existence and its functions. The first Lamfalussy directive – on market abuse
(Directive //EC) – entered into force on  April , and therefore the ESC had worked
 Christian de Visscher, Olivier Maiscocq and Fre´de´ric Varone
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as an advisory committee to the Commission at L until then (IIMG : –) before starting
exercising its ‘ central role’ of regulatory committee (CWM : ).
. Moreover, if the Council does not manage to achieve a qualified majority of votes either to approve
or to indicate its intention to oppose the draft measures within the deadline set in the basic
instrument, the Commission has committed itself not to adopt the measures if there are
‘ predominant views’ against them in the Council (aerosol clause). With the future replacement of
sunset clauses by the regulatory procedure with scrutiny, the European Parliament may, if there are
no predominant views within the Council, oppose the draft measures, which would then not be
adopted (Council Decision //EC, Art. , §). This is unlikely, however, given that, to
approve the L measures previously, the Council would have had to gather a qualified majority of
votes.
. Police-patrol oversight can be defined as the examination by the principal of ‘ a sample of the executive
agency activities, with the aim of detecting and remedying any violations of legislative goals and,
by its surveillance, discouraging such violations’ (McCubbins and Schwartz : ).
. Regarding the management procedure, from  to , less than . per cent ( of ,) of
the votes taken by the agricultural management committees led to a referral to the Council. The
Commission reported that this trend was confirmed by later statistics, specifying that no negative
opinions were delivered in  and . Subsequent data for the year  showed no negative
opinions in , draft implementing measures (Commission : ; : ). Regarding the
regulatory procedure, around  per cent of the implementing measures drawn up in  brought
about referrals to the Council. The percentage was . per cent for  (Commission : –;
: ). From  (the beginning of annual reports on the working of comitology committees:
Decision //EC, Art. , §) up to and including , there have been fifty-one referrals of
implementing measures, to be adopted under both the management and regulatory procedures (the
data do not distinguish between the two), to the Council. In percentage terms, the referrals have
not exceeded  per cent of all such measures; in  the figure decreased to none (Commission
c: ; a: ; b: ; a: ; c: ; b: ).
. All implementing measures adopted by the Commission in the Lamfalussy process, up to and
including , have received favourable opinions from the ESC (Commission a: ; d: ;
a: ; see also c: ).
. For instance, the Bewind in Dutch law and the Treuhand in German law (Witz : –).
. Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition, Art. .
. In that sense, D. J. Hayton describes the borderline between trust and agency as ‘ when the settlor’s
influence or control is so excessive that the trustees must in substance be treated merely as agents
administering and distributing his property as he wants’ (: ).
. ‘ The Commission is an agent when it exercises implementing powers delegated to it by the
Council’; it is a ‘ trustee of the member states when it exercises certain powers expressly granted to
it by the treaties, such as agenda-setting, ensuring compliance with EC law, or issuing directives and
decisions without the Council’s approval under Article () (ex Article ()) of the EC Treaty’
(Majone : ).
. No arrow is included in the relationship between the Commission and CESR due to our conclusion
in section II. that CESR is not an agent of the Commission.
. CESR is considered a trustee of the member states, rather than an agent of the Commission: hence
the absence of arrow in its relationship with the latter.
. In the explanatory memorandum for its proposal, the Commission indicated that, ‘ in view of the
urgency of action in the area of market abuse, and in view of the extensive consultations on the issue
already carried out with Member State governments, regulators and supervisors, financial industry
(Forum Group meetings) and other interested parties, the Commission has decided to come forward
with the proposal now rather than to delay it through recourse to a more formal consultative
process. In line with the report of the Wise Men, the Commission will engage in consultations, as
foreseen in the Stockholm European Council resolution, when it prepares the implementing
measures in accordance with the relevant provisions of the proposed Directive’ (Commission b:
). The Economic and Social Committee reacted by saying that ‘ the Directive itself fails to meet
one of the most important elements of the Lamfalussy Recommendations. This is that consultation
with market practitioners and other interested parties should be open and continuous throughout
the legislative process. This was not done in the case of this Directive’ (Commission b: point
..).
. The  decision holds that measures to be adopted under the regulatory procedure with scrutiny
are ‘ measures of general scope designed to amend non-essential elements of a basic instrument
Lamfalussy Reform in Securities Markets 
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
01
43
81
4X
08
00
07
67
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
as
el
 L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
11
 Ju
l 2
01
7 
at
 1
1:
06
:2
6,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article  of the Treaty [co-decision
procedure], including by deleting some of those elements or by supplementing the instrument by
the addition of new non-essential elements’ (Council Decision //EC, recital ). Measures
seeking to amend essential elements of the legislative act can only be adopted by the legislator on
the basis of the Treaty (Art. , §).
. CESR’s charter holds that, ‘ when delivering advice to the European Commission, the Committee
may vote according to the qualifying majority vote in the Council if the Chair considers that there
is a split of views or if one or more members ask for a vote’, and that, ‘ for Level  work explicitly
requested from CESR by Community legislation or directly related to Community legislation,
unanimity is required if one or more members so wishes’ (CESR : Art. , §§ and 
respectively).
. ‘ Trading has become automated in all major European exchanges, which have converged in a
common, and arguably efficient, trading model. To finance their investment in trading technology,
European exchanges have become for-profit corporations and have often sought a listing in their
markets. They have expanded their reach beyond their local jurisdiction by engaging in mergers
and alliances, and they have diversified their businesses by establishing derivative trading facilities’
(Gkantinis : ).
. ‘ The other Level  Committees indicated that similar financing issues have not arisen in their
sectors’ (IIMG : ).
. Since its creation in  (Council Decision //EC, Art. ), the right of scrutiny has been
used only twice: once in  (Commission c: ) and once in  (Commission d: –).
Even when taking into account the three other cases where the European Parliament considered
that the Commission had exceeded its implementing powers without referring to Article  of the
above decision (one case in  and two in : see Commission c: – and d: –
respectively), the total number of cases amounts to  of around , implementing measures,
adopted from  up to and including  (see section II.).
. The European Parliament favours a six-month period.
. As of  July , the common position of the Council is pending (Website of the European
Commission – Prelex, ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL = en&DosId = ).
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